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PROPERTY LAW
James W. Theobald*
Charles H. Rothenberg**
Numerous court decisions affecting property law in Virginia have
been announced since the last edition of this portion of the annual
survey.' Significant decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
Virginia Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit are discussed in Section I of this article. Furthermore, a
prolific General Assembly has passed various legislation affecting
property law ranging from condominiums to zoning. Significant
legislation is discussed in Section II.
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Adverse Possession
In Alford v. Alford,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and
remanded a trial court decision upholding title by adverse posses-
sion. In May of 1967, Helen and Robert Alford conveyed a portion
of their property to Marvin and Kent Alford. Marvin and Kent
built a store on the property. Subsequently, Helen and Robert filed
a correction deed to: (a) amend the legal description in the earlier
conveyance and; (b) grant Marvin and Kent permission to use a
twenty-foot lane on Helen and Robert's adjacent property to ac-
commodate ingress and egress to the customer parking lot appurte-
nant to Marvin and Kent's store. In 1977, Marvin and Kent's te-
nants installed gasoline pumps and underground storage tanks on
the property.'
* Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia. A.B.,
1974, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1977, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia. B.A.,
1984, State University of New York, College at Oneonta; J.D., 1987, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
1. See Berryhill, Property: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 821
(1987).
2. 236 Va. 194, 372 S.E.2d 389 (1988).
3. Id. at 195-96, 372 S.E.2d at 389-90. The deed of correction provided that "this permis-
sion is not to be construed as any type of easement, it will not be an appurtenance to the
land hereby conveyed and it may be terminated at any time." Id. at 196, 372 S.E.2d at 390.
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In 1983, Helen filed a lawsuit to determine the boundary lines of
her property. Marvin and Kent claimed title of the twenty-foot
lane by adverse possession.4 In reaching a decision, the Supreme
Court of Virginia reaffirmed the general rule that "[w]here the
original entry on another's land was by agreement or permission,
possession regardless of its duration presumptively continues as it
began, in the absence of an explicit disclaimer." 5 The court found
no evidence of a disclaimer of the permissive use of the twenty-
foot lane. Further, Helen filed suit to determine the boundary lines
within six years after the installation of the gas pumps, thereby
prohibiting any claim of adverse possession.6
B. Cities, Counties and Towns
In Smith v. Board of Supervisors,7 taxpayers sought relief from
increased assessments on two high rise office buildings. The actual
rents and expenses incurred by the taxpayers were not considered
in the county's reassessment. Instead, the county determined the
economic income for the buildings by determining the rents and
expenses incurred by all commercial buildings of similar size and
age in the county. This stream of income was then capitalized at a
rate determined by the county. The taxpayer property owners
complained that the county's method of assessment disregarded
the actual expenses incurred by the taxpayer." The court, applying
the general rule that "[w]here an assessment is based on the capi-
talization of income, contract rent and actual expenses must be
considered in arriving at economic income,"9 held that the assess-
ment was erroneous. 10
4. Id. at 195, 372 S.E.2d at 389.
5. Id. at 197, 372 S.E.2d at 390 (emphasis omitted) (citing Matthews v. W.T. Freeman
Co., 191 Va. 385, 395, 60 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1950)).
6. Alford, 236 Va. at 197-98, 372 S.E.2d at 391; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-236 (Repl.
Vol. 1984) (limitation of entry on or action for land).
7. 234 Va. 250, 361 S.E.2d 351 (1987).
8. Id. at 252-54, 361 S.E.2d at 352-53.
9. Id. at 257-58, 361 S.E.2d at 355. The taxpayer has the burden of showing that actual
rents and expenses were not considered in determining the assessment in order to overcome
the assessment's presumption of correctness. The assessing authority must then produce
evidence to show that actual rents and expenses do not reflect economic rent income for the
specific property appraised. Id. at 258, 361 S.E.2d at 356.
10. Id. In reaching its decision, the court relied on principles announced in three previous
cases relating to real property assessments. See Nassif v. Board of Supervisors, 231 Va. 472,
484, 345 S.E.2d 520, 527 (1986) ("the determination of economic rent must be specific to the
property under review as opposed to some abstract or theoretical property"); Board of Su-
pervisors v. Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 629, 325 S.E.2d. 342, 347 (1985) (county
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In another appeal from a trial court decision affirming a tax as-
sessment, the evidence showed that the county assessor deter-
mined the tax assessment without regard to the actual contract
rent produced by the property." The court in Clarke Associates v.
County of Arlington reversed the trial court's decision on the basis
that the contract rent for the property was not considered in deter-
mining the fair market value of the properties. 12
C. Contracts
1. Damages
In Schickling v. Aspinall, 3 the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined the proper allocation of losses suffered by co-tenants upon
the sale of property. The Schicklings entered into an agreement
with Aspinall to jointly purchase and own a lot owned by a third
party. The co-ownership agreement provided that the Schicklings
would occupy the house and pay 38% of the monthly mortgage
installments, while Aspinall paid 62% of the installments. The
agreement also provided that profits and losses from the sale of the
property would be allocated 95% to Aspinall and 5% to the
Schicklings. The property was sold at a loss and the Schicklings
covered the deficiency. Mr. Schickling's employer paid him
$7,179.50 to defray moving costs occasioned by the job transfer.
Aspinall claimed 95% of the amount advanced by the employer
pursuant to the co-ownership agreement. The Schicklings counter-
claimed for 95% of the $3,429.50 shortfall. 4 The court determined
that: (1) the co-ownership agreement entitled the Schicklings to re-
imbursement of 95% of the shortfall from Aspinall; and (2) As-
pinall was not entitled to any portion of the $7,179.50 paid by
Schickling's employer as reimbursement for moving expenses."
cannot ignore actual rents and expenses for the sake of uniformity and arrive at higher than
fair market value assessment); Fairfax County v. Nassif, 223 Va. 400, 404-05, 290 S.E.2d
822, 824-25 (1982) ("economic rent is the measure to be used in capitalizing income for fair
market value determination; however, contract rent is relevant as evidence of economic
rent").
11. Clarke Assocs. v. County of Arlington, 235 Va. 624, 369 S.E.2d 414 (1988).
12. Id. at 629, 369 S.E.2d at 416.
13. 235 Va. 472, 369 S.E.2d 172 (1988).
14. Id. at 474-75, 369 S.E.2d at 173.
15. Id. at 475-76, 369 S.E.2d at 174. The court declined to decide whether or not the
collateral source rule applies to contract cases on the grounds that Mr. Schickling was a
defendant in the case. By definition, the rule applies to collateral compensation received by
a plaintiff. Arguably, the Schicklings' counterclaim for 95% of the $3,429.50 shortfall casts
Mr. Schickling in the role of plaintiff. However, the court stated that Aspinall could not
1989]
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At issue in Danburg v. Keil,'6 was whether certain damages
claimed by a contract purchaser were recoverable as expenses
under an action for breach of contract. Pursuant to a contract
dated October 1, 1983, the Keils agreed to sell property to
Danburg.17 The contract provided that in the event of default the
"defaulting party shall be liable for . . . any expenses incurred by
the non-defaulting party, including attorneys' fees, in connection
with this transaction and the enforcement of such [c]ontract."' 8
The parties signed a typewritten letter dated October 5, 1983,
whereby the Keils gave Danburg permission to perform certain
landscaping and exterior improvements on the property. A dispute
arose among the parties, and Danburg sought to rescind the con-
tract and claimed reimbursement for the expenses he incurred in
making the improvements. 19 The Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined that Danburg's claim for funds expended was for conse-
quential and not direct damages. 20 The court held that Danburg
was not entitled to recover his landscaping expenses because they
were consequential damages, which were not contemplated by the
parties at the time the purchase contract was executed.2'
2. Failure of Conditions Precedent
The two issues considered in Smith v. McGregor22 were: (1)
whether the failure of a condition precedent left either party to a
contract for the purchase of land in default under the contract;
and, (2) whether, in view of the parties' repudiation of the contract
for failure of the condition precedent, the realtor was entitled to a
commission. 23 The contract required the sellers to furnish the pur-
chasers with a survey showing that the property contained 200
acres. The actual survey depicted only 191 acres.24 The court inter-
derive a benefit from Mr. Schickling's employment contract since Aspinall was not a party
to that contract. Id. at 475, 369 S.E.2d at 174.
16. 235 Va. 71, 365 S.E.2d 754 (1988).
17. Id. at 72, 365 S.E.2d at 755.
18. Id. at 74, 365 S.E.2d at 756 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 74-75, 365 S.E.2d at 756-57.
20. Id. at 75-76, 365 S.E.2d at 757. The court compared direct damages, "which naturally
or ordinarily flow from the breach" of a contract to consequential damages, which "arise
from the intervention of special circumstances not ordinarily predictable." Id. (quoting
Morris v. Mosby, 227 Va. 517, 523, 317 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1984)).
21. Danburg, 235 Va. at 76, 365 S.E.2d at 757.
22. 237 Va. 66, 376 S.E.2d 60 (1989).
23. Id. at 68, 376 S.E.2d at 61.
24. Id.
[Vol. 23:773
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preted this requirement as a condition precedent, which, not being
satisfied, permitted the purchasers to void the contract.2 5
As to the second issue, the court held that the realtor was not
entitled to his fee. The failure of the condition precedent relieved
both parties of their obligations under the contract. Therefore, the
broker failed to produce a purchaser who was ready, willing and
able to purchase the property upon the terms of the contract.26
3. Fraud
In Patrick v. Summers,2 7 Patrick, a real estate broker, and Sum-
mers entered into an exclusive listing agreement by which Patrick
agreed to buy the Summers' home, assume existing obligations
thereon and pay the Summers $5,000 if Patrick did not sell the
property within 120 days. The Summers purchased another house
but Patrick was unable to sell their old home and failed to
purchase it pursuant to the listing agreement. The Summers
rented their old home and finally sold it through another realtor.
The net proceeds from the sale were less than the $5,000 they
would have received had Patrick performed under his agreement.2 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's decision
overruling Patrick's motion to set aside the trial jury's verdict for
$15,000 in punitive damages, holding that the evidence did not
clearly, cogently and convincingly prove that Patrick entered into
the agreement with an intention not to perform his obligations.
Thus, the evidence was insufficient to establish an action for fraud
or deceit.29
In Boykin v. Hermitage Realty,3 ° the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the evidence that supported a jury verdict in a
suit for damages for fraud was sufficient to show that the purchas-
ers were induced to purchase property by a real estate agent's mis-
representation. Four couples, the plaintiffs, purchased units in a
25. Id. at 75, 376 S.E.2d at 65.
26. Id. at 75-76, 376 S.E.2d at 65.
27. 235 Va. 452, 369 S.E.2d 162 (1988).
28. Id at 453-54, 369 S.E.2d at 163-64.
29. Id. at 455-56, 369 S.E.2d at 164. The general rule is that fraud must relate to an
existing fact, not unfulfilled promises. Id. at 454, 369 S.E.2d at 164 (citing Soble v. Herman,
175 Va. 489, 500, 9 S.E.2d 459, 644 (1940)). This rule is qualified in that fraud may be
proved where a party makes promises with no intent to perform. Patrick, 235 Va. at 454,
369 S.E.2d at 164 (citing Lloyd v. Smith, 150 Va. 132, 142, 145 S.E. 363, 365 (1928)).
30. 234 Va. 26, 360 S.E.2d 177 (1987).
19891
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condominium developed by Yeonas. Yeonas' exclusive real estate
agent represented to each couple that the wooded area behind the
units would not be developed. Each couple paid an additional
$1,000 for this added privacy. Yeonas later constructed a play-
ground in the wooded area.31
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision to set aside a
verdict in their favor. The defendants contended that the general
rule that "an action based upon fraud must aver the misrepresen-
tation of present pre-existing facts, and cannot ordinarily be predi-
cated on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events
32
prohibited a finding of misrepresentation based on Yeonas' failure
to live up to its promise not to develop the wooded area. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed, pointing out that fraud may be
based on an intent not to perform a promise at the time such
promise is made. 3 The court also rejected the agent's caveat
emptor defense, stating that "a vendor who procures the sale by
fraudulent representations may not invoke the doctrine of caveat
emptor."34
4. Rescission of Contracts
In Marriott v. Harris,35 the court considered whether purchasers
of lots in a subdivision were entitled to rescission of their purchase
contracts. The contracts required the purchasers to execute prom-
issory notes and deeds of trust to secure the repayment of the bal-
ance of the purchase price. The contracts incorporated a report
filed by the developer with the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development ("HUD") for approval in accordance
with the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.3 6 The report
represented that the developer would install water and sewer facil-
ities, roads and underground utilities by December 31, 1974."7 The
31. Id. at 27-29, 360 S.E.2d at 177-78.
32. Id. at 29, 360 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting Lloyd v. Smith, 150 Va. 132, 145, 142 S.E. 363,
365 (1928)).
33. Id. at 29-30, 360 S.E.2d at 178-79.
34. Id. at 30, 360 S.E.2d at 179.
35. 235 Va. 199, 368 S.E.2d 225 (1988). The case actually involves three appeals from
litigation arising out of the development of a residential subdivision. The first appeal is not
relevant to this discussion. See id. at 207-12, 368 S.E.2d at 228-31. For a discussion of the
third appeal heard by the court, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
36. Marriott, 235 Va. at 206, 368 S.E.2d at 227; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982 & Supp.
V 1987).
37. Marriott, 235 Va. at 206, 368 S.E.2d at 227.
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developer assigned each contract, promissory note and deed of
trust to its lender in order to secure financing for the project. The
roads, water lines and sewer facilities were not installed. The de-
veloper abandoned the project, and the purchasers ceased making
payments on their promissory notes. In July 1975, the county ap-
proved a comprehensive development plan. In June 1978, the
county downzoned the development making it ineligible for central
water and sewer service.38
The Supreme Court of Virginia, holding that the purchasers
were entitled to rescission of the contracts based on a substantial
failure of consideration, addressed a number of contentions raised
by the developer. The court rejected the developer's argument that
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act preempted Virginia's
longer statute of limitations for an action seeking rescission of con-
tract.3 The court found that the HUD report, incorporated by ref-
erence into the purchase contract, was properly considered by the
trial court. It was also proper for the trial court to consider the
subdivision plats showing the roads, waterlines and sewer facilities,
as well as subdivision ordinances requiring developers to install
such facilities, in determining that the developer was obligated to
install this infrastructure in the development.40 The court held
that the purchasers were entitled to rescission of the purchase con-
tracts based on a substantial failure of consideration, specifically
the developer's failure to install the roads, water and sewage
facilities.4'
5. Specific Performance
In Bass v. Smith,42 Carter and Bass agreed to convey property to
Smith. The sellers, whose wives were not parties to the contract,
appealed a decree ordering specific performance.43 The Supreme
38. Id.
39. Id. at 213-14, 368 S.E.2d at 232. "[T]he rights and remedies provided by this chapter
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in
equity." 15 U.S.C. § 1713 (1982); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
40. Marriott, 235 Va. at 214-15, 368 S.E.2d at 232-33. The court also characterized as
"absurd" the developer's contention that the purchasers were prohibited from enforcing
their rights to have the developer fulfill its obligation to install the infrastructure because a
clause in the contract required the purchasers to purchase the property "as is." Id. at 216,
368 S.E.2d at 233.
41. Id. at 216-18, 368 S.E.2d at 233-34.
42. 234 Va. 1, 360 S.E.2d 162 (1987).
43. Id. at 2, 360 S.E.2d at 162.
1989] 779
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Court of Virginia determined that Smith's refusal to pay full con-
sideration for the property, notwithstanding the wives' failure to
convey their interests in the property, was fatal to Smith's suit for
specific performance."
6. Statute of Frauds
In Beach v. Virginia National Bank," the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision to sustain an executor's
demurrer to a complaint for specific performance of an oral prom-
ise to convey land. Jones promised to convey four and one-half
acres of land with improvements thereon to Beach in consideration
for Beach's promise to perform labor one day each week on a farm
owned by Jones. Beach performed the work and, relying on the
oral contract to convey, took occupancy of and made valuable im-
provements to the property. Jones died without conveying the
property to Beach.46 The court determined that Beach did not es-
cape operation of the statute of frauds because the oral agreement
did not state with certainty all of the terms of the agreement. Spe-
cifically, the consideration for the property was uncertain because
the agreement did not establish the time period for which Beach
was required to perform work in consideration for the property.
47
7. Terminable-At-Will Contracts
In Duggin v. Adams," the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether a motion for judgment contained sufficient allegations to
support a prima facie case of tortious interference with a termina-
ble-at-will sales contract. Duggin contracted to purchase real estate
from Williams. The contract provided that either party could ter-
minate the contract if certain conditions were not satisfied. Duggin
assigned his rights to purchase the property to Centennial in con-
sideration of an assignment fee. Duggin alleged that Centennial
notified Williams' attorney, Adams, that Centennial was prepared
to settle. At Adams' direction, Williams did not attend the closing.
Adams provided Williams with $50,000 to refund Duggin's deposit.
Then, Adams and Williams signed a contract pursuant to which
44. Id. at 2-3, 360 S.E.2d at 163.
45. 235 Va. 376, 367 S.E.2d 516 (1988).
46. Id. at 377, 367 S.E.2d at 517.
47. Id. at 378-79, 367 S.E.2d at 517-18; see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
48. 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E.2d 832 (1987).
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Adams agreed to purchase the property and Williams agreed to
cancel her contract with Duggin. Later, Adams offered to sell the
property to Centennial.4 9 The court determined that Duggin's mo-
tion for summary judgment set forth allegations sufficient to show
a prima facie case for tortious interference with a terminable-at-
will contract.50
D. Deeds
In Martin v. Phillips,51 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
and remanded a trial court decision setting aside two deeds and a
lease on the grounds of undue influence. The court found two er-
rors in the lower court's judgment. First, the trial court erred in
requiring that the elements of undue influence be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; the proper standard of proof is one of
clear and convincing evidence.2 Second, the court found error in
the trial court's determination that once the party attacking the
validity of a deed or lease established a presumption of undue in-
fluence, the burden of persuasion shifted to the proponents of the
instruments.53 A presumption operates to shift to the opposing
party the burden of producing evidence which tends to rebut the
presumption; however, no presumption "can operate to shift the
ultimate burden of persuasion from the party upon whom it was
originally cast. ' '54
In Spence v. Griffin,55 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
trial court's finding of actual fraud. The facts in the case were as
follows: Mr. Spence, a preacher, and his wife received permission
49. Id. at 222-25, 360 S.E.2d at 834-35.
50. Id. at 230, 360 S.E.2d at 838. The elements of a prima facie showing of tortious inter-
ference with a contract not terminable at will include: (1) a binding contractual relationship;
(2) knowledge of the contractual relationship; (3) intentional interference with the contrac-
tual relationship causing a breach of the contract; and (4) damage to the party whose con-
tractual relationship has been disrupted. Id. at 226, 360 S.E.2d at 835 (citing Chaves v.
Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985)). Where a terminable-at-will contract is
involved, the injured party must also show that the interfering party employed improper
methods of interference. Improper methods of interference include illegal or independently
tortious means, including violence, threats, bribery, malicious prosecution, duress, undue
influence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary relationship. Duggin, 234 Va. at 227-28, 360 S.E.2d
at 836.
51. 235 Va. 523, 369 S.E.2d 397 (1988).
52. Id. at 528, 369 S.E.2d at 400.
53. Id. at 526, 369 S.E.2d at 399.
54. Id. (citing Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561, 569, 185 S.E. 879, 883 (1936)).
55. 236 Va. 21, 372 S.E.2d 595 (1988).
1989]
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from Mrs. Griffin to use a vacant lot adjacent to her restaurant for
religious services. Several months before the Spences' arrival, Mrs.
Griffin's estranged husband had taken the life of Mrs. Griffin's son
by a previous marriage. In addition, Mrs. Griffin was under a doc-
tor's supervision following heart surgery several years before. Mrs.
Griffin attended Mr. Spence's revivalist prayer meetings. At one
such meeting, and in the presence of his congregation, Mr. Spence
asked Mrs. Griffin to donate the lot for the construction of a
church. Mrs. Griffin agreed to convey the lot subject to an ease-
ment for parking in connection with her restaurant and a rever-
sionary interest in the event the property ceased to be used for a
church. 6 Mrs. Griffin communicated these limitations to the attor-
ney retained by the Spences to draft the deed.
One afternoon, the Spences and their attorney asked Mrs. Grif-
fin to meet them at the circuit court clerk's office prior to the office
closing for the day. Mrs. Griffin left her restaurant to meet them.
When she arrived at the clerk's office, the attorney represented
that the deed had been drawn pursuant to Mrs. Griffin's direc-
tions. Mrs. Griffin, anxious to return to her busy restaurant, signed
the deed without reading it carefully, and the deed was recorded.5 7
The Spences began constructing improvements on the lot and
sought financing to complete the work. However, they could not
obtain financing because of the parking easement which was re-
served by Mrs. Griffin. Mr. Spence demanded that Mrs. Griffin
correct the deed by removing the easement. Mrs. Griffin, reading
the deed for the first time, noted that the instrument conveyed the
lot to the Spences rather than to the church and that the instru-
ment did not contain the requested reversionary provision. The
Spences brought suit to have the easement removed alleging mis-
take and fraud. Mrs. Griffin's cross bill demanded rescission on the
grounds of fraud and undue influence. 8
The court rejected the Spences' contention that the absence of
any false misrepresentation on their part prohibited a finding of
actual fraud. Where one party relies on the existence of a material
fact and the other party knows of this reliance but, by word or
conduct, fails to disclose the material fact, the failure to disclose
satisfies the requirement for a false representation. 9 The condi-
56. Id. at 23-24, 372 S.E.2d at 595-96.
57. Id. at 24-25, 372 S.E.2d at 596.
58. Id. at 27, 372 S.E.2d at 598.
59. Id. at 28, 372 S.E.2d at 598-99.
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tions under which Mrs. Griffin executed the deed, the Spences' at-
torney's representations regarding the inclusion of the reversionary
provision in the deed, and the fact that the Spences knew that
Mrs. Griffin signed the deed under a false assumption were suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding of actual fraud. 0
E. Deeds of Trust
Two recent cases evidence the Supreme Court of Virginia's con-
tinuing scrutiny of non-judicial foreclosures. The facts in Smith v.
Credico Industrial Loan Co.61 are as follows: Patterson and Morin
were named as substitute trustees under a deed of trust securing a
note made by Smith and payable to Credico. Smith defaulted on
the note and a foreclosure was held at which Patterson was the
sole acting trustee. Morin, who had not resigned as trustee as of
the date of foreclosure, bid the property in on behalf of Credico.
Smith challenged the sale contending that a trustee cannot
purchase property at her own sale. 2 The court agreed, holding that
"a co-trustee under a deed of trust cannot purchase property on
behalf of herself or another at a foreclosure sale, even when that
sale is conducted by another trustee, and even where the trustee
who makes the purchase was not an active participant in con-
ducting the sale."63
In Deep v. Rose, 4 the court considered whether a foreclosure
sale should be set aside for the trustee's failure to advertise the
foreclosure pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust. A partner-
ship defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on an apart-
60. Id. at 29, 372 S.E.2d at 599. The court, acknowledging the rule that a grantor is bound
by his deed even though he fails to read it, determined that the rule was inapplicable when
the grantee induced the grantor not to read the deed. Id. (citing Carter v. Carter, 223 Va.
505, 509, 291 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1982)).
61. 234 Va. 514, 362 S.E.2d 735 (1987).
62. Id. at 515, 362 S.E.2d at 736.
63. Id. at 517-18, 362 S.E.2d at 737; see Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank, 215 Va. 149,
207 S.E.2d 837 (1974) (setting aside foreclosure sale where acting trustee purchased trust
property indirectly through corporation in which trustee owned stock); Smith v. Miller, 98
Va. 535, 37 S.E. 10 (1900) (setting aside foreclosure sale where acting trustee purchased
property with bid intended to insure that the full value was obtained for the trust property).
The court's decision in Credico Indust. Loan Co. is consistent with Whitlow and Miller in
that public policy demands that the trustee, a fiduciary, represent the interests of those for
whom he acts. However, Justice Whiting, in Credico Indust. Loan Co. contends that the
holdings in Whitlow and Miller should only extend to active trustees. 234 Va. at 518, 362
S.E.2d at 737-38 (Whiting, J., dissenting).
64. 234 Va. 631, 364 S.E.2d 228 (1988).
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ment project. The deed of trust required publication of a foreclo-
sure advertisement five times in a newspaper of general circulation
in the city or county in which the property was located. Keith, the
trustee, advertised the sale on five consecutive days and held the
foreclosure sale on the last day of the advertisement.6 5
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the foreclosure sale
was void because it failed to comply with the mandatory require-
ments of section 55-59.2 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code") 66
The court also determined that the trustee was not entitled to re-
cover his commission or expenses because by failing to comply
with the mandatory requirements of section 55-59.2 resulting in
the setting aside of the foreclosure, he rendered no service to the
trust or the parties.6
In Yaffe v. Heritage Savings & Loan Association,s the trustee
conducted a foreclosure sale pursuant to an advertisement stating
that the sale was subject to a first deed of trust in addition to any
unfiled mechanics' liens. Yaffe bid the property in at the foreclo-
sure. The trustee drafted and signed a memorandum of sale. Yaffe
refused to tender a deposit or close the transaction, claiming that
he did not know that the property was sold subject to a prior deed
of trust. The trustee readvertised the foreclosure and sold the
property to another purchaser on a bid $30,000 less than Yaffe's
bid. Heritage and the trustee brought suit to recover the $30,000
from Yaffe. 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a number of issues in
Yaffe. First, the court determined that section 55-59.4(2) of the
Code is permissive; the trustee may waive or require a deposit in
his discretion. 0 Second, the court rejected Yaffe's contention that
the foreclosure sale was incomplete. Although "[t]here is no rigidly
65. Id. at 634, 364 S.E.2d at 229-30.
66. Id. at 636, 364 S.E.2d at 231. Section 55-59.2 provides that "the sale shall be held on
any day following the day of the last advertisement which is no earlier than eight days
following the first advertisement nor more than thirty days following the last advertise-
ment." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
67. Deep, 234 Va. at 638, 364 S.E.2d at 232.
68. 235 Va. 577, 369 S.E.2d 404 (1988).
69. Id. at 579-80, 369 S.E.2d at 405; see Definite Contract Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Tumin,
158 Va. 771, 790, 164 S.E. 562, 568 (1932) (describing a trustee's authority to readvertise a
foreclosure sale at the risk of a purchaser who fails to close pursuant to his bid).
70. Yaffe, 235 Va. at 581, 369 S.E.2d at 406. Section 55-59.4(2) provides that "Itihe Trus-
tee may require of any bidder at any sale a cash deposit of as much as ten per cent of the
sale price . . . before his bid is received." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(2) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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prescribed prerequisite for the conclusion of an auction sale for
real property," a foreclosure sale is complete when the auctioneer
(1) receives the last and highest bid; (2) gives clear notice of his
intent to accept that bid if no other bids are made; (3) gives other
potential bidders at the foreclosure an opportunity to submit
higher bids; and, (4) clearly announces that the highest bid is ac-
cepted and the sale complete."' Third, the court found that Yaffe
could not withdraw from the contract on the grounds that he was
unaware of the prior deed of trust where the status of title to the
property was clearly stated in the foreclosure advertisement. 2
Finally, the court addressed Yaffe's contention that the statute
of frauds prohibited the enforcement of the memorandum of sale
signed only by the trustee after the foreclosure sale. The court de-
termined that when a trustee acts as auctioneer, he acts as agent
for both buyer and seller at the foreclosure sale and his signature
as the purchaser's agent is sufficient to charge the purchaser with
his obligations under the memorandum of sale.73 The trustee's exe-
cution of the memorandum of sale in his capacity as auctioneer
satisfied the statute of frauds. 4
F. Deed of Trust Notes
The issue in Taylor v. Roeder,"5 was whether a variable interest
rate note was negotiable. Old Town Investment Corporation bor-
rowed $18,000 from VMC Mortgage Company. The loan was evi-
denced by a note secured by a deed of trust on land. The note
provided for interest at three percent over the prime rate of Chase
Manhattan Bank which is adjusted monthly. Taylor purchased the
land from Old Town and sent funds to VMC for payment of the
loan. Taylor never received a cancelled note or a release from the
deed of trust. Prior to the conveyance, VMC pledged the note to
71. Yaffe, 235 Va. at 581, 369 S.E.2d at 406.
72. Id. at 582, 369 S.E.2d at 406-07 (" 'Where the terms and conditions of an auction sale
are plain and unambiguous and are plainly announced at the time and place of sale, they are
binding upon a purchaser at the sale, whether he heard them announced or not and though
he may not have understood them.'" Id. (quoting Definite Contract Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Tumin, 158 Va. 771, 782, 164 S.E. 562, 565 (1932)) (emphasis added in Yaffe)).
73. Yaffe, 235 Va. at 582, 369 S.E.2d at 407; see VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(6) (Repl. Vol.
1989).
74. Yaffe, 235 Va. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 407.
75. 234 Va. 99, 360 S.E.2d 191 (1987). Taylor encompasses two cases consolidated at trial
and on appeal. The relevant facts for both cases are substantially the same. Therefore, only
one set of facts is summarized in the text.
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the trustee of a pension fund to secure a loan from the pension
fund. VMC defaulted on the loan from the pension fund and filed
for bankruptcy. The trustee demanded payment from Old Town,
the original maker, and Taylor, the new owner of the property,
claiming holder in due course status. Old Town and Taylor de-
fended on the grounds that the note had been paid in full.76 The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the note was not negotiable
because it required an outside source to determine the amount due
- in this case, the Chase Manhattan Bank's varying prime rate.
Therefore, the trustee took the note subject to the defense of pay-
ment in full.77
In one of the three cases consolidated in Marriott v. Harris,78
the purchasers of residences in the subdivision sought to enjoin the
developer's lender from foreclosing on their lots pursuant to the
deeds of trust and notes executed by the purchasers and assigned
to the lender to secure financing for the project.79 The court held
that the lender did not forfeit its holder in due course status by
accepting an assignment of the notes with the knowledge that the
notes were given pursuant to executory contracts and were, there-
fore, subject to rescission for failure of consideration if the infra-
structure of the development was not completed.80
76. Id. at 101-02, 360 S.E.2d at 192-93.
77. Id. at 104, 360 S.E.2d at 193. Section 8.3-104(1)(b) of the Code of Virginia provides
that in order to be deemed negotiable, an instrument must "contain an unconditional prom-
ise or order to pay a sum certain in money." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-104(1) (Add. Vol. 1965 &
Cum. Supp. 1989). The Virginia General Assembly recently amended section 8.3-106(1) of
the Code of Virginia to create an exception to the sum certain requirement for variable
interest rate notes. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
78. 235 Va. 199, 368 S.E.2d 225 (1988).
79. 235 Va. at 220, 368 S.E.2d at 235. For a summary of the relevant facts in this case, see
supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 225, 368 S.E.2d at 239. At the time the developer assigned the notes to the
lender, no breach had occurred. Therefore, the lender had no notice that the executory con-
tracts were voidable. Id. The court also rejected the purchasers' contention that the lender's
acceptance of the assignments of the notes and deeds of trust obligated the lender to com-
plete the infrastructure for the subdivision. In reaching its determination, the court distin-
guished commercial assignments to secure obligations from general assignments of the assets
and obligations of a business. Id. at 222, 368 S.E.2d at 236. In addition, the court deter-
mined that a reference in each note to the deed of trust securing the note was an accelera-
tion clause which did not affect the negotiability of a note. Id. at 225, 368 S.E.2d at 238; see
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-105(1)(c) (Add. Vol. 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
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G. Easements
1. Damages
The sole question before the court in Dillingham v. Hall,"' was
the propriety of an award of damages where the owner of the servi-
ent estate blocked off a right of way. However, owners of the par-
cels served by the right of way failed to produce sufficient evidence
of their loss at trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
trial court's award of compensatory damages in the amount of one
dollar per day was speculative and improper since the award was
unsupported by any evidence quantifying the damages sustained
by the owners of the parcels served by the blocked right of way.82
2. Party Walls
In C & E Partnership v. Donnelly, 3 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a wall located entirely upon one party's property
did not constitute a party wall in favor of the owner of adjacent
property. The court, noting that the wall did not straddle the
boundary line dividing the adjacent owners' parcels, determined
that the presumption of a party wall did not arise.84 In addition,
the wall failed to meet other definitions of party walls; specifically:
(1) title to the wall was not held by the adjacent property owners
as tenants in common; and, (2) the wall was not located on one
owner's property and subject to an easement in favor of the adja-
cent property.85
3. Prescriptive Easements
The issue in Preshlock v. Brenner 6 was whether a prescriptive
easement could be obtained against a private party's property
where the property was already subject to an easement for a public
storm sewer. The dominant estate owner acknowledged that: (1)
the prescriptive easement would be subject to the prior public
easement; and, (2) the prescriptive easement was asserted against
81. 235 Va. 1, 365 S.E.2d 738 (1988).
82. Id. at 4, 365 S.E.2d at 739.
83. 235 Va. 301, 367 S.E.2d 490 (1988).
84. Id. at 304, 367 S.E.2d at 491; see Bellenot v. Laube, 104 Va. 842, 52 S.E. 698 (1906) (a
wall located astride a property line is presumed to be a party wall subject to cross-ease-
ments in favor of the adjoining property owners).
85. Donnelly, 235 Va. at 304, 367 S.E.2d at 492.
86. 234 Va. 407, 362 S.E.2d 696 (1987).
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the servient estate owner's fee, not the public easement. The court
reasoned that since the public easement was nonexclusive, the ser-
vient estate owner was not prohibited from conveying subsequent
easements or rights which did not unreasonably interfere with the
public easement.8 7 The court held that a prescriptive easement in
the same property encumbered by the public easement was not un-
obtainable as a matter of law.8
In Ward v. Harper,s9 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether a party's use of a right of way constituted a continuous
use for the purpose of establishing a prescriptive easement in the
right of way. For over twenty years, Harper used a road for logging
purposes over property owned by Ward and Ward's predecessor in
title. Harper used the road once or twice each year for transporting
cut timber and machinery to and from his property. Ward erected
a gate across the road prohibiting ingress and egress to Harper's
property.90 The court rejected Ward's argument that the use was
sporadic and not continuous. Harper's continuous use of the right
of way in a seasonal timber operation satisfied the continuous use
element of adverse possession.9 1
H. Eminent Domain
In Hampton Roads Sanitation District v. McDonnell,92 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered whether Hampton Roads Sani-
tation District's pumping of raw sewage into a private party's
property constituted a taking. The evidence showed that a pump
station owned and operated by Hampton Roads was located near
McDonnell's property. The pump station was intentionally
designed to divert the overflow from the pump onto the adjacent
property. Over 2,000,000 gallons of waste water were pumped onto
McDonnell's property within an approximately nine month pe-
riod.93 The court held that the resulting damage to the property
constituted a taking for which McDonnell was entitled to compen-
87. Id. at 410, 362 S.E.2d at 698. "Any easement that may be acquired by grant also may
be acquired by prescription." Id. (citing Haines v. Galles, 76 Wyo. 411, 419, 303 P.2d 1004,
1006 (1936)).
88. Preshlock, 234 Va. at 411, 362 S.E.2d at 698.
89. 234 Va. 68, 360 S.E.2d 179 (1987).
90. Id. at 71-72, 360 S.E.2d at 180-81.
91. Id. at 72, 360 S.E.2d at 182.
92. 234 Va. 235, 360 S.E.2d 841 (1987).
93. Id. at 236-37, 360 S.E.2d at 842-43.
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sation pursuant to the Constitution of Virginia.9 4
The sole question in United States v. 312.50 Acres, Prince Wil-
liam County, Virginia,es was whether a trial court in a condemna-
tion suit properly allowed into evidence the sale of adjacent com-
parable land under an unconditional contract executed as the
result of an arm's length transaction. The purchase price in the
contract was $15,000 per acre. The jury fixed the value of the land
at $13,500 per acre. The court, relying on the doctrine of equitable
conversion, found that the contract transcended a mere offer to
purchase land and, therefore, was "unquestionably admissible to
show value."9 6
In State Highway & Transportation Commissioner v. Lanier
Farm, Inc.,97 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the com-
pensability of damages allegedly sustained by a developer. Lanier
owned a 130 acre tract of land held for future development. An
unrecorded subdivision plat located the entrance to the develop-
ment on a curving road. The entrance did not meet the locality's
visibility requirements, but Lanier believed that the city would
agree that the curvature of the road would prohibit motorists from
exceeding a thirty mile an hour speed limit. The highway commis-
sioner sought to acquire one acre of the property for the purpose of
straightening out the road. Lanier sought damages to compensate
him for the costs he would incur in relocating the entrance and a
decrease in the overall value of the development resulting from the
less attractive entrance. The highway commissioner objected to the
$65,000 awarded to Lanier for damages to the residue of the
development. 8
The court held that the award was inappropriate for several rea-
sons. First, Lanier's contention that the city would require a relo-
cation of the proposed entrance was speculative. Second, even if
94. Id. at 238, 360 S.E.2d at 845. The court distinguished McDonnell from Elizabeth
River Tunnel District v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d 685 (1961) in which the court,
applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity, held that the tunnel district was immune from
an action arising out of personal injuries sustained by a passenger on a bus operated by the
tunnel district. McDonnell arose out of damage to property. The court also quoted article I,
§ 11, of the Constitution of Virginia as guaranteeing to an owner "just compensation both
where his property is taken for public uses and where it is damaged for public uses." Mc-
Donnell, 234 Va. at 238, 36 S.E.2d at 845.
95. 812 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 157.
97. 233 Va. 506, 357 S.E.2d 531 (1987).
98. Id. at 509, 357 S.E.2d at 532.
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the city required Lanier to relocate the entrance, that requirement,
which would not extinguish Lanier's access to a public right of
way, would be a valid exercise of the city's police power and would
not be compensable as a taking. Third, frustration of Lanier's
plans for future development was speculative and not compensa-
ble. Finally, an increase in negligent or unlawful use of the high-
way by third parties arising by the taking was not compensable. 99
The sole issue resolved by the court in State Highway & Trans-
portation Commission v. Goodrich'"0 was whether the Virginia
State Highway and Transportation Commissioner was entitled to
amend a certificate recorded pursuant to section 33.1-122 of the
Code of Virginia during a condemnation trial to reduce the amount
of property taken. The court held that the commissioner could, ab-
sent fraud or arbitrary action, amend the certificate of deposit dur-
ing the trial.10
I. Future Interests
In Mullins v. Simmons, 02 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the effect of the following inter vivos conveyance: "to Norcia
.. .during her natural life, and at her death to her children, if
any, and if the said Norcia. . .shall die without issue, then to the
next of kin on her fathers [sic] side."'103 Norcia gave birth to a
daughter, Laura. Laura gave birth to a daughter, Lynn. Laura
died. Then Norcia died. The court determined that this convey-
ance created a life estate in Norcia and a vested remainder subject
to open and a condition subsequent in Laura. 04
The appeal arose out of two ejectment suits filed by Lynn's hus-
band, Mullins, after Lynn's death to recover property previously
conveyed by Norcia and Laura. The court disposed of Mullins' ar-
gument that the remainder to Laura vested at Norcia's death not-
ing that the law favors early vesting of estates. Therefore, Norcia
and Laura could not convey more than Norcia's life estate. 05
The court also rejected Mullins' argument that Lynn was an
99. Id. at 509-10; 357 S.E.2d at 533-34.
100. 237 Va. 144, 375 S.E.2d 745 (1989).
101. Id. at 147, 375 S.E.2d at 747; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-121, -122 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
102. 235 Va. 194, 365 S.E.2d 771 (1988).
103. Id. at 195-96, 365 S.E.2d at 772.
104. Id. at 196-97, 365 S.E.2d at 722.
105. Id. at 197, 365 S.E.2d at 772.
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original taker under the deed. The court declined to construe
"children" to include "grandchildren". Also, the court declined to
imply a grant to Norcia's issue. Finally, the court ruled that Lynn
could not take as next of kin because Norcia did not die without
issue. Therefore, the gift over to the next of kin failed.108
J. Joint Tenancies
In Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 07 the Supreme Court of Virginia was
asked to decide whether nonconsenting tenants in common could
enjoin coal mining on their property pursuant to agreements en-
tered into by the remaining tenants in common. About eighty-five
percent of the tenants in common of an eighty-one acre tract exe-
cuted leases permitting Chosar to mine coal on the property. The
court held that: (1) the mining constituted waste as to the noncon-
senting tenants in common; (2) that an injunction against further
mining was appropriate; and (3) that the mining constituted an ex-
clusion of the nonconsenting co-tenants entitling them to an ac-
counting of profits arising from the coal leases.' 8
K. Land Trusts
In Curtis v. Lee Land Trust,0 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether beneficiaries of a land trust could be held per-
sonally liable on a deed of trust note which they did not sign. The
owners of a tract of land conveyed the property to a land trust.
The sellers financed a portion of the purchase price by taking back
a deed of trust note secured by a deed of trust on the property.
Both instruments were executed by the trustee under the land
trust. Payments were not made under the note and the seller fore-
closed on the property. The foreclosure resulted in a deficiency
which the seller sought to recover from the land trust and the land
trust beneficiaries."10 The court, rejecting the seller's contention
that the trustee under the land trust executed the note and deed of
trust as an agent for the beneficiaries, ruled that the beneficiaries
106. Id. at 197, 365 S.E.2d at 772-73.
107. 235 Va. 660, 370 S.E.2d 305 (1988).
108. Id. at 664-65, 370 S.E.2d at 307-08. The court also held that the trial court properly
enjoined Chosar's use of an underground passageway created by the mining to transport
coal across the co-tenants' property from a third party's adjacent property. Id. at 665, 370
S.E.2d at 308.
109. 235 Va. 491, 369 S.E.2d 853 (1988).
110. Id. at 493, 369 S.E.2d at 853-54.
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were not personally liable on the note.111 The court also noted that
exculpatory language contained in the note and deed of trust pro-
hibited a finding of personal liability against the beneficiaries. 2
L. Landlord and Tenant
In Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 13 the Supreme
Court of Virginia was asked to determine whether a landlord has a
duty to protect a tenant against injury from third parties. The
facts showed that the front door to the tenant's apartment did not
have a dead bolt lock. The tenant was raped in her apartment by
an assailant who may have gained access to the apartment through
the front door. The tenant sued the apartment complex owners
and the manager of the apartment complex for negligence. The su-
preme court reversed the trial court's order entering judgment for
the tenant and thereby reaffirmed the rule that a landlord owes no
duty to protect his tenant from criminal acts by third persons." 4
The court also determined that section 55-248.13:1 of the Code,"'
which requires a landlord to install dead bolt locks upon written
request by a tenant, preempted a county ordinance prohibiting any
person from leasing an apartment to another unless all doors were
equipped with dead bolt locks meeting minimum specifications.16
The supreme court distinguished Klingbeil, and similar cases
arising out of tort, from the facts before it in Richmond Medical
Supply Co. v. Clifton,"7 a suit arising out of breach of contract." s
In Clifton, a landlord expressly agreed in writing to repair an en-
trance door to commercial property. The landlord failed to repair
the door and thieves burglarized the leased premises by entering
the defective door.119 The court, ruling that the landlord could be
held liable for damages suffered by the tenant arising from the
landlord's breach of its contractual obligation, reversed the trial
court's order granting the landlord summary judgment and re-
111. Id. at 496-97, 369 S.E.2d at 855-56. The trustee under the land trust clearly signed
the note and deed of trust in its capacity as trustee for the trust, not in any representative
capacity for the trust beneficiaries. See id. at 497, 369 S.E.2d at 856.
112. Id. at 497, 369 S.E.2d at 856.
113. 233 Va. 445, 357 S.E.2d 200 (1987).
114. Id. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13:1 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
116. 233 Va. at 448, 357 S.E.2d at 203; see infra note 184 and accompanying text.
117. 235 Va. 584, 369 S.E.2d 407 (1988).
118. Id. at 587, 369 S.E.2d at 409.
119. Id. at 586, 369 S.E.2d at 408.
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manded the case to permit the fact finder to consider the tenant's
claim for breach of contract.2 °
In a case of first impression, the court in Jones v. Dokos Enter-
prises, Inc.121 determined the rights of a lessee and his assignee as
to security deposits. The facts showed that the lessee under two
leases with McDonald Restaurant Corporation contracted to sell
his interests in two McDonald stores to an assignee. The contracts
made no reference to two $15,000 security deposits required under
the leases. 2 2 The court held that since the rights to the security
deposits were not addressed in the purchase contracts nor contem-
plated by the parties and the lessee's assignments of the leases did
not relieve the lessee of its obligations under the lease, the lessee
was entitled to receive back the security deposits.'2 3
M. Marital Property
In Cousins v. Cousins,24 the Court of Appeals of Virginia con-
sidered whether the trial court properly classified property as the
separate property of a spouse. The court held that property con-
veyed to a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety constituted
marital property notwithstanding the fact that the property was
conveyed by the wife's parents as an advancement on her
inheritance.' 25
N. Mechanics' Liens
In McMerit Construction Co. v. Knightsbridge Development
Co.,' "26 the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the rule that a
120. Id. at 587, 369 S.E.2d at 409.
121. 233 Va. 555, 357 S.E.2d 203 (1987).
122. Id. at 556, 357 S.E.2d at 204.
123. Id. at 559, 357 S.E.2d at 206.
124. 5 Va. App. 156, 360 S.E.2d 882 (1987).
125. Id. at 159, 360 S.E.2d at 884. The court noted that, by definition, separate property
must be titled in one party. Id.
For additional cases involving property distribution upon divorce, see Westbrook v. West-
brook, 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988) (property purchased in one party's name may
be treated as marital property under the doctrine of transmutation, where the property is
treated as marital property and a written instrument evidences the parties' intent that sepa-
rate property will be marital property, even if the instrument is not a deed or will); Brown v.
Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 361 S.E.2d 364 (1987) (holding that property conveyed by a father
to his son in consideration of son's assumption of a debt on the property jointly with his
father was entirely marital property).
126. 235 Va. 368, 367 S.E.2d 512 (1988).
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waiver of lien rights must be expressed or, if implied, established
by clear and convincing evidence. The court determined that a
contractor's execution and delivery of a document acknowledging
receipt of full payment from the owner of property in connection
with construction thereon did not constitute a waiver of the con-
tractor's right to file liens against the property, especially in view
of the fact that the owner and the contractor were engaged in a
heated debate regarding additional sums due under the construc-
tion contract. 12 7
In Donohoe Construction Co. v. Mount Vernon Associates,2 '
the supreme court determined that the words contained in a mem-
orandum of mechanic's lien were entitled to an absolute privilege
precluding recovery by a property owner on a slander of title claim.
Since the filing of a memorandum of lien is a prerequisite to a
mechanic's lien suit, filing the memorandum of lien constitutes a
judicial proceeding entitling it to an absolute privilege if the words
contained therein are relevant and pertinent to the suit.'29
0. Notice of Lis Pendens
At issue in Green Hill Corp. v. Kim,130 was whether, by record-
ing a notice of lis pendens, an unsecured creditor created a lien
entitling the creditor to relief from a debtor's bankruptcy stay.
The creditor obtained a personal judgment against the debtor. The
debtor filed bankruptcy prior to the creditor docketing its judg-
ment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
bankruptcy court and district court rulings denying the creditor
relief from the stay on two grounds. First, the court reasoned that
the lis pendens merely served as notice of the underlying suit; no
lien was created by recording the notice.' 3 ' Second, the court noted
that the Supreme Court of Virginia had interpreted the lis pendens
statute as being applicable to disputes concerning title to real
property, not actions for personal judgments.3 2
127. Id. at 374, 367 S.E.2d at 515.
128. 235 Va. 521, 369 S.E.2d 857 (1988).
129. Id. at 538-39, 369 S.E.2d at 861.
130. 842 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1988).
131. Id. at 744; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-268 (Cum. Supp. 1989); see infra notes 189-91
and accompanying text.
132. Kim, 84 F.2d at 744 (citing Preston's Drive Inn Restaurant, Inc. v. Convery, 207 Va.
1013, 154 S.E.2d 160 (1967)).
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P. Partition
In Leake v. Casati,'3 the court considered whether a chancellor
in a suit to partition land in kind is bound by a county subdivision
ordinance. John and Joe Leake owned property as tenants in com-
mon. John Leake conveyed his property to Casati, the owner of an
adjacent tract of land. Joe Leake refused to sell his interest to
Casati, and Casati sued for partition by sale. The chancellor in the
case, after determining that partition in kind would be subject to
the county subdivision ordinance, ruled that the partition would be
impracticable and inconvenient. The chancellor ordered the sale of
Joe Leake's interest.13 4 The court, refusing to find an implied legis-
lative intent to deprive the court of its power to do equity between
the parties, ruled that the subdivision ordinance did not apply to
the court's exercise of its power to partition land in kind. The su-
preme court remanded the case to the lower court. 35
In Smith v. Woodlawn Construction Co.,136 the Supreme Court
of Virginia ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing a suit to
partition where the parties seeking partition were unable to show
the value of the property they sought to partition. The partitioners
put on a prima facie case of ownership of the property entitling
them to a partition in kind regardless of value. 3 The court also
determined that the trial court erred in awarding costs to the de-
fendants because the defendants failed to refute the complainant's
prima facie showing of an interest in the land.'38
Q. Real Estate Brokers
In Smithy Braedon Co. v. Hadid,"'3 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered, among other things, whether Virginia
law prohibited the enforcement of a real estate brokerage contract
pursuant to which commissions were to be split with an unlicensed
133. 234 Va. 646, 363 S.E.2d 924 (1988).
134. Id. at 649, 363 S.E.2d at 926.
135. Id. at 652, 363 S.E.2d at 928. For a case describing the proper method of determining
parties' interests in property involved in a partition suit, see Shannon v. Hall, 235 Va. 360,
368 S.E.2d 695 (1988)(holding that the parties' interests in property should have been calcu-
lated on a percentage of ownership basis, not on a value basis).
136. 235 Va. 424, 368 S.E.2d 699 (1988).
137. Id. at 430, 368 S.E.2d at 703. The value of property is relevant only where partition
by sale is sought. Id.
138. Id. at 430-31, 368 S.E.2d at 703.
139. 825 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1987).
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broker which performed no services or acts restricted to licensed
brokers. The court held that the statute in question did not apply
to prohibit the enforcement of the contract where no services were
performed or rendered by the unlicensed broker. 14 0
R. Restrictive Covenants
In Bain v. Bain,' the Supreme Court of Virginia considered re-
strictions contained in deeds applied to property retained by the
grantor. The grantor subdivided a portion of his ten acre tract into
six lots. The subdivision plat provided that all lots in the subdivi-
sion were subject to restrictions contained in a recorded deed of
dedication. The deed of dedication prohibited mobile homes on
any lot. The subdivision plat showed the entire tract. However, the
deed of dedication contained language which evidenced the gran-
tor's intent to include only the six subdivided lots in the subdivi-
sion. Several lot purchasers sought to enforce the restriction on
mobile homes against the grantor's remaining property on which
the grantor maintained his mobile home and on which he sought to
create a mobile home park. 4 '
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the lot
purchasers' request for injunctive relief. The court determined that
any ambiguity arising from the subdivision plat and deed must be
resolved in favor of the free use of the property. The court also
refused to find an implied reciprocal negative easement because
the lot purchasers failed to show a scheme of development evidenc-
ing the grantor's intent to bind his retained property with the re-
strictions. The court noted that the grantor maintained his mobile
home on the retained property. 4 3
S. Riparian Rights
The central issue in Langley v. Meredith1 4 4 involved the deter-
mination of riparian rights of owners of three parcels of land. The
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court erred in deter-
mining the parties' riparian rights by extending the property lines
140. Id. at 792; see VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2106 (Repl. Vol. 1988) (original version at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54-749 (1982)).
141. 234 Va. 260, 360 S.E.2d 849 (1987).
142. Id. at 262-63, 360 S.E.2d at 850-51.
143. Id. at 264-65, 360 S.E.2d at 851-52.
144. 237 Va. 55, 376 S.E.2d 519 (1989).
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dividing each parcel into the water. This method of determining
riparian rights, the court noted, would deprive at least one owner
of his legal right of access from his property to the line of naviga-
bility. Considering the meandering nature of the shore line, the
court stated that the proper method of determining each owner's
riparian rights was to allocate to each owner a share of the line of
navigability proportionate to each owner's share of the shore
line. 1 45
T. Subdivision
In Baum v. Lunsford,46 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
the trial court's holding that a landowner had been wrongfully de-
nied a variance to permit subdivision of her land. The owner's pro-
posed subdivision would have created two nonconforming lots. The
supreme court held that the trial court erred inasmuch as the
property owner's claim of financial loss standing alone was insuffi-
cient grounds to justify granting the variance. 147
U. Zoning
In City Council v. Harrell,148 the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that the trial court erred in entering a declaratory judgment
invalidating the city council's denial of an application for a condi-
tional use permit to operate a gasoline pump in connection with a
convenience store. Harrell constructed a convenience store on
property located at the entrance to a residential area. He applied
for a conditional use permit to install gasoline pumps on the prop-
erty. The application was approved, subject to certain conditions
imposed by both the city's director of planning and the planning
commission. However, the city council denied the permit on the
basis that it would be inappropriate to locate the gasoline station
at the entrance to the residential area.149 The supreme court based
its decision on its finding that Harrell failed to present evidence
showing that the use permitted by the zoning ordinance was
unreasonable. 150
145. Id. at 63, 376 S.E.2d at 523 (citing Groner v. Foster, 94 Va. 650, 652-53, 27 S.E. 493,
494 (1897)).
146. 235 Va. 5, 365 S.E.2d 739 (1988).
147. Id. at 8, 365 S.E.2d at 741.
148. 236 Va. 99, 372 S.E.2d 139 (1988).
149. Id. at 100-01, 372 S.E.2d at 140-41.
150. Id. at 103, 372 S.E.2d at 141-42. A prima facie case that denial of a conditional use
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In Gwinn v. Alward,151 the supreme court considered several is-
sues concerning the enforcement of remedies for zoning ordinance
violations. A property owner operated a junkyard on his property
in violation of the county's zoning ordinance. The county issued
trash hauling permits to the owner for many years notwithstanding
these violations. In 1984, the county denied the owner's trash haul-
ing permit. The owner sought to compel the county to issue the
permit, and the county sought to enjoin the use of the property as
a junkyard. The owner failed to appeal a decision handed down by
the county's zoning administrator in 1984 that the owner's use of
the property as a junkyard was not permitted. The owner had also
received communications from various county officials suggesting
that the use of the property violated the zoning ordinance. 152
The central issue addressed by the court was whether the county
could enforce its zoning ordinance by refusing to issue a trash
hauling permit. The court ruled that nothing prohibited the zoning
administrator from seeking to enforce the zoning ordinance
through a cross-bill filed in a suit brought by the owner to appeal
the denial of a trash hauling permit. 53 Therefore, the trial court
erred in refusing to grant the county's request for injunctive relief
against the owner's violation of the zoning ordinance.3 4 The court
also held that the owner's failure to appeal the zoning depart-
ment's rulings that the owner's property use violated the zoning
ordinance estopped the owner from contesting those determina-
tions at the time of the suit. In addition, the court rejected the
owner's argument that the county was estopped from denying his
trash hauling permit, thereby reaffirming the rule that estoppel
does not apply to the government and the exercise of governmental
functions. 55
permit is unreasonable requires the party challenging the denial to show that: (1) the pro-
posed use of the property is reasonable and; (2) the existing ordinance as applied to the
property is unreasonable. Harrell failed to satisfy the second prong of this test. Id. at 103,
372 S.E.2d at 141. For a case addressing the validity of a denial of an application for a
conditional use permit, see City of Covington v. APB Whiting, Inc., 234 Va. 155, 360 S.E.2d
206 (1987) (where evidence tended to show the suitability of property for both residential
and commercial use, the reasonableness of a decision by the city council to deny an applica-
tion to rezone the property for commercial use was fairly debatable, and, therefore, should
have been affirmed by the trial court.).
151. 235 Va. 616, 369 S.E.2d 410 (1988).
152. Id. at 617-20, 369 S.E.2d at 410-12.
153. Id. at 622, 369 S.E.2d at 413; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491(d), -499 (Repl. Vol.
1989).
154. Gwinn, 235 Va. at 622-23, 369 S.E.2d at 413.
155. Id. at 621, 369 S.E.2d at 412-13.
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II. LEGISLATION
A. Condominiums
Section 55-79.40 of the Code of Virginia'56 has been amended to
provide that the warranties against structural defects contained in
section 55-79.79 of the Code'57 and the disclosure statement re-
quired in section 55-79.94158 are not applicable to the declarant of
a conversion condominium if a declarant is a proprietary lessees'
association thaf immediately before the creation of the condomin-
ium owned fee simple title to or a fee simple reversionary interest
in the real estate described in section 55-79.54(a)(3) of the Code.'59
Section 55-79.75 of the Code' 60 is changed to provide that meetings
of the executive organization of a condominium unit owners' asso-
ciation must be open to all unit owners, subject to certain
exceptions.
B. Deeds of Trust, Promissory Notes and Property Insurance (or
Lender's Counsel's Corner)
Section 55-58.2 allows a noteholder named in a credit line deed
of trust to amend or modify the noteholder's address set forth. in
the deed of trust by a recorded amendment. 161 Prior to this
change, the noteholder's address could not be changed by amend-
ment to the deed of trust.
Section 8.3-106 of the Code 162 has been amended to provide that
a sum payable is a sum certain if a rate of interest "is readily as-
certainable by a reference in the instrument to a published statute,
regulation, rule of court, generally accepted commercial or finan-
cial index, compendium of interest rates, or announced or estab-
lished rate of a named financial institution.' ' 63
Recently enacted section 6.1-2.6:1 of the Code164 prohibits a
lender from establishing, as a condition to receiving or maintaining
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.40 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
157. Id. § 55-79.79.
158. Id. § 55-79.94.
159. Id. § 55-79.54(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
160. Id. § 55-79.95 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-58.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
162. Id. § 8.3-106.
163. Id. This section, as amended, vitiates the holding in Taylor v. Roeder, 234 Va. 99,
360 S.E.2d 191 (1987), supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.6:1 (Supp. 1989).
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a loan secured by a deed of trust or mortgage, a requirement that
the borrower provide property insurance in an amount "exceeding
the replacement value of the improvements on the real
property."' 16 5
C. Dower and Curtesy
Section 55-40 of the Code 6 6 is amended to make the section gen-
der neutral. Curtsey and dower rights are now disposed of
similarly.
D. Eminent Domain
Section 36-27 of the Code 67 is amended to provide that a court
may consider the effect which rezoning applications and applica-
tions for special use permits or variances may have on the value of
property in condemnation proceedings.
E. Escheats and Disposition of Unclaimed Property
The General Assembly recently placed some additional responsi-
bilities on escheators selling lands for cash. Section 55-186 of the
Code"6 8 is changed to require the escheator at the time of sale to
(a) have the purchaser sign an authorization for recording prior to
distribution; and (b) collect the clerk's fee required by section 14.1-
112(2) of the Code.169 A procedure is established for paying the
sale proceeds to the state treasurer and recording the grants with
the local clerk's office. Also, this section provides that grants of
escheated property are exempt from recording taxes.'7 0
The General Assembly made four significant revisions to the
statutes affecting the disposition of unclaimed property. First, sec-
tion 55-210.8:1 of the Code' 71 is amended to provide that a gift
certificate or credit memo which remains unclaimed by the owner
for more than three years after becoming payable or distributable
is presumed abandoned.
165. Id.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-40 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-27 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-186 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
169. Id. § 14.1-112(2) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
170. Id. § 55-186.
171. Id. § 55-210.8:1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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The second change is that section 55-210.9:2 of the Code 171 now
requires the clerk of each circuit court or the general receiver, if
any, to identify money held by them which remains unclaimed by
the owner for more than one year after the money became payable
or distributable. There is an exception for funds deposited as com-
pensation or damages in condemnation proceedings.'73
Third, the General Assembly amended section 55-210.25 of the
Code 174 to establish a seven year limitation period in which the
state treasurer must commence an action to enforce the reporting,
payment or delivery of property presumed abandoned.
Finally, the General Assembly changed section 55-210.27:1 of the
Code 75 to reduce, from fifteen percent to ten percent, the fee
which a person may charge another for the purpose of locating
property included in a report to the state treasurer. Also, a person
cannot enter into a contract to locate property which he knows has
been reported, paid or delivered to the state treasurer prior to
thirty-six months after such report, payment or delivery. 7
F. Landlord and Tenant
1. Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The General Assembly amended section 55-248.14 of the Code 177
by deleting a sentence providing that a landlord, upon a convey-
ance of property subject to a rental agreement, is liable to his ten-
ant for property or money to which the tenant is entitled unless
the property or money is delivered to the landlord's purchaser with
the consent of the purchaser and tenant. 7 ' Now a tenant must
seek to recover the property or money from the landlords' pur-
chaser, the new landlord. This amendment makes an assignment of
security deposits from the landlord to his purchaser essential to
protect the purchaser from tenants' demands for the repayment of
security deposits upon the termination of their leases.
Recently, the General Assembly made numerous changes to
landlords' remedies. For example, a landlord may now terminate a
172. Id. § 55-210.9:2. (Cum. Supp. 1989).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 55-210.25.
175. Id. § 55-210.27:1.
176. Id.
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.14 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
178. Id. § 55-248.14 (comment 3).
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rental agreement immediately and obtain possession of the prem-
ises pursuant to section 55-248.35 of the Code 179 where a tenant's
unremediable breach involves or constitutes a criminal or willful
act.180 Also, a landlord may accept rent with reservation by giving
his tenant notice of acceptance of the rent with reservation so as
not to waive the landlord's right to obtain an order of possession
terminating the rental agreement.' 8 ' In addition, section 55-248.35
provides that after the termination of a rental agreement, the land-
lord, in obtaining post-possession judgments for actual damages, is
not required to seek a judgment for accelerated rent to the end of
the term of the tenancy. 82 Finally, section 55-248.35 is amended to
provide that where a landlord brings an unlawful detainer action,
the court may grant the landlord a simultaneous judgment for
money due and for possession of the premises without a credit for
any security deposit. The security deposit will be credited to the
tenant's account upon the tenant vacating the premises.'83
Any county, city or town, pursuant to section 55-248.13:1 of the
Code, 184 may require a landlord who rents five or more units in any
building to install security devices which meet minimum
specifications.
2. Mobile Home Lot Rental Act
Section 55-248.45 of the Code'8 5 is amended to prohibit land-
lords from demanding or collecting fees from providers of cable tel-
evision or other television broadcast services in exchange for giving
tenants access to such services. Additionally, landlords may not
charge tenants for such services unless landlords provide such
services. 181
G. Marital Property
Section 20-107.3(A)(2) of the Code 8 7 is amended to provide that
marital property is "presumed to be jointly owned unless there is a
deed, title or other clear [evidence] that it is not jointly owned."
179. Id. § 55-248.35.
180. Id. § 55-248.31.
181. Id. § 55-248.34.
182. Id. § 55-248.35.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 55-248.13:1.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.45 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
186. Id. § 55-248.45(A)(4).
187. VA.CoDE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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H. Mortgage Brokers
A real estate agent or broker who receives compensation from a
lender for directing purchasers to the lender for loans in connec-
tion with the acquisition of real property must disclose to the pur-
chaser in writing the real estate agent or broker's relationship with
the lender and the fact that the lender may not offer the lowest
interest rate or best terms available to the purchaser.' s
I. Notice of Lis Pendens and Recordation of Liens
Section 8.01-268 of the Code'8 9 provides that "[n]o memoran-
dum of lis pendens shall be filed unless the action on which the lis
pendens is based seeks to establish an interest by the filing party
in the real property described in the memorandum."' 90 In addition,
section 8.01-269 of the Code' 9' now provides that if a lis pendens is
dismissed, if the underlying cause is dismissed, or if a judgment is
entered for the defendant, the court may impose sanctions as pro-
vided in section 8.01-271.1 of the Code.192
J. Recordation of Options
Section 55-57.2 of the Code'93 describes the effect of recording
an option or similar agreement. Further, the section describes the
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-422 (Supp. 1989); see id. § 6.1-411.9 (Supp. 1989).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-268 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
190. Id. § 8.01-268(B).
191. Id. § 8.01-269.
192. Id.; § 8.01-271.1.
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989). Section 55-57.2 states:
EFFECT OF OPTION; RECORDING.-A. Any option to purchase real estate, and any memo-
randum, renewal or extension thereof, shall be void as to (i) all purchasers for valua-
ble consideration without notice not parties thereto and (ii) lien creditors, until such
instrument is recorded in the county or city where the property embraced in the
option, memorandum, renewal or extension is located.
B. Notwithstanding any rule of law or equity denominated "fettering," "clogging the
equity of redemption" or "claiming a collateral advantage" or any similar rule:
1. A party secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, without adversely affecting his
security interest, may acquire from a borrower any direct or indirect present or future
ownership interest in the collateral encumbered thereby, including rights to any in-
come, proceeds or increase in value derived from such collateral; and
2. An option to acquire an interest in real estate granted to a party secured by a
mortgage or deed or trust, other than an option granted to such party in connection
with a mortgage loan as defined in § 6.1-409, is effective according to its terms and
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effect of an option granted to a party secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust.194
K. Subdivision
The General Assembly recently amended the requirements and
procedure for submitting and approving subdivision plats. Section
15.1-475 of the Code19 5 now requires the identification of graves on
site plans of land proposed for a subdivision. The section is also
amended to provide that if the local commission or other agent
fails to take action on a subdivider's preliminary plat within ninety
days after it has been submitted for approval, the subdivider may,
within ten days notice to the commission or agent, petition the cir-
cuit court for an order directing approval of the plat.19 6 In addi-
tion, if the local commission or agent disapproves a proposed plat,
the local commission or agent must identify the deficiencies in the
plat which resulted in the disapproval by reference to specific ordi-
nances, regulations or policies. 197 A subdivider may challenge a dis-
approval of its preliminary plat as improper, arbitrary or capri-
cious by filing an appeal with the circuit court within sixty days
after the written disapproval by the local commission or agent.198
A zoning ordinance in a county having the urban county execu-
tive form of government may permit a single division of a lot or
parcel of property for sale or gift to a member of the property
owner's immediate family. 199
Municipalities may adopt ordinances requiring that, where
streets in a subdivision will not qualify for state street mainte-
nance funds paid to municipalities, the subdivision plat and simi-
lar instruments must disclose that the streets do not meet state
standards and will not be maintained by the municipality enacting
the ordinance or by the Virginia Department of Taxation. Counties
and municipalities may enact ordinances establishing "minimum
takes priority as provided in subsection A of this section if the right to exercise the
option is not dependent upon the occurrence of a default under the mortgage or deed
of trust.
Id.
194. Id.
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-475 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(kl).
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standards for the construction of streets that will not be built to
state standards."200 The procedures201 regarding the subdivider's fi-
nancial commitment to complete such streets and the release of
such financial commitment, respectively, may apply to such streets
by duly adopted ordinance.20 2
L. Virginia Property Owners' Association Act and Related
Legislation
The Virginia Property Owners' Association Act20 3 generally ap-
plies to property owners' associations which, pursuant to a re-
corded declaration of covenants or similar instrument, have the au-
thority to impose assessments on lots and which are charged with
the responsibility of maintaining or operating common areas.20 4
The act requires associations to keep accurate books and records of
their income, expenses and activities. Members may inspect the as-
sociation's records, except for records of a sensitive or privileged
nature as more fully described in the act.20 More importantly, the
act requires that contracts for the sale of lots in developments sub-
ject to the act include a statement disclosing that the lot is located
in a development subject to the act and that the purchaser can
require the seller to obtain information regarding the development
from the association. Failure to include this disclosure statement
in the contract permits the purchaser to rescind the contract. 20 6
The act also establishes procedures for (a) the adoption and en-
forcement of rules by the board of directors of the association; (b)
the levying of special assessments by the board of directors; and
(c) filing liens for unpaid assessments due from lot owners.207
Section 13.1-870.1 of the Code is amended to limit the liability
of officers and directors of community associations to the amount
of compensation received by the officer or director from the associ-
ation during the twelve months preceding the act or omission for
which liability is imposed. However, this limit does not apply "if
the officer or director engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing
violation of the criminal law. 20 9
200. Id. § 15.1-466(D).
201. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(f),(i).
202. Id. § 15.1-466(D).
203. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -516. (Cum. Supp. 1989).
204. Id. § 55-508, -514.
205. Id. § 55-510.
206. Id. § 55-511.
207. Id. 88 55-513 to -516.
208. Id. § 13.1-870.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
209. Id.
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M. Zoning
The General Assembly made two significant amendments to sec-
tion 15.1-491 of the Code.21 ° The section now provides that zoning
ordinances may include reasonable regulations as to mixed-use de-
velopments, planned unit developments, and the administration of
incentive zoning."1' Also, the section is amended to state that mo-
tions or petitions to amend a zoning ordinance shall be acted upon
within twelve months unless the applicant withdraws his motion or
petition in which event processing the motion or petition shall
cease.
2 12
Section 15.1-493 of the Code z21 is amended to provide that the
failure of a local commission to report its recommendations on a
proposed amendment to, or re-enactment of, a zoning ordinance
within ninety days shall be deemed approval of the amendment or
re-enactment unless the "proposed amendment or reenactment has
been withdrawn by the applicant prior to the expiration of
such. . . period" in which event processing of the proposed amend-
ment or re-enactment must cease.
21 4
Section 15.1-491.2:1 of the Code 1 5 permits certain counties and
cities experiencing high levels of population growth to include in
their zoning ordinances voluntary proffering of reasonable condi-
tions by the owner seeking rezoning provided that: (i) the rezoning
itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii) such conditions
have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all such condi-
tions are in conformity with the comprehensive plan. Furthermore,
the section prohibits counties, cities or towns from accepting prof-
fers "unless it has adopted a capital improvement program pursu-
ant to [section] 15.1-464 or local charter." If the proffered condi-
tions .include dedications of real property or payment of cash, the
facilities for which such property is dedicated or cash is tendered
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
211. Id. § 15.1-491(i) to (). "Mixed use developments," "planned unit developments" and
"incentive zoning" are defined in section 15.1-430(r), (s) and (t), respectively of the Code of
Virginia. Id. § 15.1-430(r) to (t).
212. Id. § 15.1-491(g).
213. Id. § 15.1-493.
214. Id. § 15.1-493(B).
215. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1.
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must be included in the capital improvement program prior to ac-
cepting a dedication of the property or payment of cash. 16
Section 15.1-496 of the Code217 is amended to provide that the
governing body of any city, town or county may provide by ordi-
nance that substantially the same applications for a special excep-
tion or variance will not be considered by the board within a pe-
riod not to exceed one year.
Sections 15.1-498.1 to 15.1-498.10218 establish procedures by
which certain counties, cities and towns may adopt ordinances im-
posing impact fees for road improvements.
Section 15.1-499.1219 is amended to provide that any county, city
or town may adopt an ordinance establishing a "uniform schedule
of civil penalties for violations" of zoning ordinances.
Section 15.1-446.1220 is changed to provide that a locality's com-
prehensive plan may include designated areas for the implementa-
tion of reasonable ground water protection measures.
Section 15.1-491.5221 is amended to provide that in addition to
the zoning applicant, any other person who is aggrieved by a deci-
sion of a zoning administrator may petition the governing body of
the locality for a review of the zoning administrator's decision.
Section 15.1-493222 is changed to provide that decisions of the
local governing body adopting or failing to adopt proposed zoning
ordinances or amendments or granting or failing to grant special
exceptions must be filed within thirty days of such decision with
the circuit court.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Virginia and the General Assembly have
addressed a number of interesting issues over the past two years.
Several areas have received, and should continue to receive, a
heightened level of attention. A number of recent decisions ren-
dered by the supreme court evidence a desire to protect existing
216. Id.
217. Id. § 15.1-496.
218. Id. § 15.1-498.1 to .10.
219. Id. § 15.1-499.1.
220. Id. § 15.1-446.1.
221. Id. § 15.1-491.5.
222. Id. § 15.1-493.
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property rights. This is particularly clear in the area of nonjudicial
foreclosure sales. Virginia practitioners should expect this trend to
continue.
Many planned unit developments must now comply with the
Virginia Property Owners' Association Act which became effective
in 1989. Practitioners preparing declarations of covenants and con-
stituent documents for planned unit developments must be famil-
iar with the act. The authors predict that as the number of
planned unit developments in Virginia increases, additional judi-
cial and legislative guidance in the areas of drafting and enforcing
such documents will be forthcoming.
Virginia practitioners should familiarize themselves with recent
supreme court decisions interpreting easement rights. Case law in-
terpreting easement rights should continue to evolve as reliance on
easement rights for the enjoyment of property increases.
Both the cost and pace of real estate development in Virginia
will undoubtedly foster many legislative initiatives and judicial at-
tacks throughout the next decade. Impact fees and other growth
management tools will attempt to allocate the cost of growth in
Virginia.
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